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 Guinea-Bissau:
 24 September 1973 and Beyond
 Richard Lobban
 On 24 September 1973 history was made in Africa. The first sub-
 Saharan African nation unilaterally declared its sovereignty from
 European colonialism following a protracted armed struggle. Most
 African nations gained their independence from colonial powers by
 negotiation and peaceful transfer of authority. True enough, this
 transfer was sometimes linked with prolonged periods of demon-
 strations, strikes, and nationalist propagandizing, but with the ex-
 ception of Algeria (and perhaps Ethiopia) there were no wars of
 national liberation which led to a declaration of independence until
 Guinea-Bissau. The implications of this move are immense.
 The emergence of the PAIGC (African Party for Independence in
 Guinea-Bissau and the Cape Verde Islands) in 1956 was the first
 necessary step which brought about the great event of 24 September
 1973. The declaration on this date by the 120 members of the National
 Popular Assembly is not an arbitrary event but symbolizes a result of
 seventeen long and bloody years of struggle. Accordingly we must first
 look back to see where the PAIGC has come from in order to judge the
 importance of the declaration and to suggest some of the coming
 events.
 Historical Prelude
 The small triangle of former Portuguese territory in West Africa,
 Guinea-Bissau, is sandwiched between Senegal and Guinea-Conakry,
 both former French colonies. Today this is the scene of the most ad-
 vanced political and military struggle against Portuguese colonialism
 in Africa. From the earliest days of Portuguese contact dating to 1446,
 the African people sought to maintain their independence. Not until the
 19th century did the Portuguese (or any colonial power) make any
 major effort to penetrate the interior of Africa beyond their coastal
 trading and slaving centers. Immediately after the partition of Africa
 Richard Lobban is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Rhode Island College,
 Providence, Rhode Island. He spent a month this summer with PAIGC visiting what
 became on September 24th the independent state of Guinea-Bissau.
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 in the infamous Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 the African people of
 Guinea-Bissau launched an armed struggle against the Portuguese.
 Fighting sputtered on and off from 1886 to 1936 when military rule was
 finally brought to the 14,000 square miles of flat and often marshy
 countryside. Strict repression and control earned the Portuguese
 about two decades of relative peace. After the second war of the im-
 perialist powers, African nationalists found Europe weak,
 disorganized, and unable to continue the colonial structure. As early as
 1948 young African students such as Amilcar Cabral (then 24 years
 old), Agostinho Neto, and Mario de Andrade met in Lisbon and began
 discussing the futures of their respective nations which were still
 under colonial rule. Within a dozen years of these informal talks
 several North African countries had already moved to end
 colonialism. By 1956 a handful of Africans met secretly in Bissau to
 chart their own future toward independence. A year later Ghana broke
 away from England. The small group in Bissau felt that they were
 simply moving along with the tide of world events and that the for-
 mation of the PAIGC would subsequently lead them to freedom from
 colonialism as it had their African brothers and sisters. The basic
 strategy was to unite the few intellectuals and the progressive workers
 in a series of strikes and demonstrations that would convince the
 Portuguese authorities of the futility of their colonial enterprise. Based
 on reports of this nationalist activity the Portuguese secret police or
 PIDE (now known as DGS) arrived in Bissau in 1957. On 3 August 1959
 in the Pidjiguiti dock area in Bissau a strike of longshoremen was
 brutally suppressed with at least fifty killed and more wounded. This
 setback brought the leadership of the PAIGC to two conclusions. First,
 the Portuguese were not about to grant independence to their African
 colonies. Second, the tactics of strikes, demonstrations, and petitions
 would not be sufficient to gain national liberation.
 The small party determined that only a protracted armed struggle
 would ever allow them to reach their goal. For more than three years a
 clandestine network of PAIGC supporters was built up and many
 received military training for guerrilla warfare. At the same time a
 careful analysis of the class and ethnic structure of Guinea-Bissau was
 formulated in order to determine who could be counted as friend and
 who should be considered as an enemy of the movement. The suc-
 cesses of the PAIGC can be attributed, in part, to this careful stage of
 planning and preparation. The concept of the 'foco' had no place in the
 tactics of the PAIGC. Basic organization preceded rather than
 followed military activities in contrast to the Debray or Guevara
 models which rely on 'armed propaganda' for popular mobilization.
 The armed struggle began in the south across from Guinea-Conakry
 but the meticulous planning accounted for the opening of the North
 Front within six months. The initial gains by the PAIGC stunned the
 Portuguese who were still reeling from the bold attacks of the MPLA in
 Angola in 1961. By February 1964 the politico-military struggle was
 16
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 sufficiently advanced to call the first national congress inside
 liberated zones. The first national elections were held in 1972. Today
 eighty percent of the country is under PAIGC control; the Portuguese
 remain only in the major towns and in a number of fortified posts,
 which have now begun to fall to the PAIGC. No place in the entire
 country has been immune from attacks.
 The Portuguese Fight Back
 The Portuguese, with vital support from the NATO countries and
 particularly the United States have fought to hold every inch of the
 territory with their 40,000 troops. Some Portuguese have been trained
 in counter-insurgency tactics in the United States itself where they
 learned the use of napalm, defoliants, and the strategic hamlet system
 of population concentration.
 In November 1970 the Portuguese launched an attack on the main
 PAIGC external office in Conakry. They hoped to kill Cabral, crush the
 PAIGC and to topple the radical government of Sekou Toure. None of
 these objectives was achieved and the invasion was completely routed
 with the mobilization of the local militia and regular armed forces.
 A little more than three years later the Portuguese tried again.
 This time, on 20 January 1973, they succeeded in assassinating the
 founder of the PAIGC and temporarily kidnapped the new Secretary
 General, Aristides Pereira. The murder was followed by a propaganda
 campaign saying that the PAIGC had split over regional or political
 differences. In actuality the PAIGC has emerged even stronger for this
 sorry experience. In my travels in the liberated zones during June of
 1973 I often asked whether the death of Cabral had been a blow to the
 movement. Everyone agreed that the loss had been tragic and Cabral
 will always be remembered with great love, but the movement was too
 well organized and too strong for it to be stopped. In the Fall of 1972
 Cabral had promised that independence would be declared before the
 end of 1973. The PAIGC has kept his promise. Such have been the
 highlights of the political events from the origin of the PAIGC to 24
 September 1973.
 On The Military Front
 Other events of major significance have taken place. From 1963 to
 1973 the Portuguese had almost complete control of the air. The armed
 militants of the PAIGC and the people in the liberated villages were
 constantly subject to barbarous air raids of napalm and white
 phosphorus as well as defoliants and strafing. In fact, as the Por-
 17
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 tuguese lost more and more on the ground they relied more and more
 on air power. However, from March 1973 to the present the PAIGC has
 claimed almost thirty Portuguese G-91 NATO jets, helicopters of
 French make, and a variety of other support aircraft. On one hand the
 successes against enemy aircraft have been psychologically
 devastating. Some Portuguese pilots have refused to fly over areas of
 PAIGC control, and a commanding officer was put in prison for sup-
 porting his mens' refusal. On the other hand the erosion of Portuguese
 air control has permitted bolder ground action by the PAIGC army.
 Perhaps the most significant example of this is to be seen in the fall of
 the fortified base at Guilege in the south. This base had been under
 seige by PAIGC artillery for months but subterranean quarters,
 trenches, barbed wire, and electronic minefields made it a difficult
 target. With improved weapons the PAIGC brought down support
 aircraft and tightened their control until the base was severely
 demoralized by the PAIGC artillery, harrassing actions, and am-
 bushes. The Portuguese fled from this base leaving much war material
 and many documents behind on 25 May 1973. The fall of Guilege made
 a hole in the Portuguese defense network on the South Front where
 some of the greatest military activity has been. The Portuguese
 commanding officer of Guilege was put into jail for his tactical retreat.
 With the improved PAIGC weaponry the Portuguese are having a
 harder time holding their fortified posts and a number have come
 under harsh attack. Posts like Gadamael and the town of Cacine are
 served by boat now that air support has become unreliable. Mining of
 the rivers by the guerrillas will try to cut the flow of supplies to these
 locations. The encirclement continues and will only increase in the
 coming months.
 The PAIGC and National Reconstruction
 The war of the PAIGC is not just on the battlefield. Great strides
 toward national reconstruction have been made. The nation has been
 shattered by 500 years of colonial contact and has been derailed from
 the track of history. New institutions and services must be constructed
 to put the people back on the rails. Education under the Portuguese
 was extremely limited. The PAIGC now boasts of more than 200
 schools in the liberated zones and more than 250 teachers to staff them.
 Headway is being made to eliminate illiteracy, develop a national
 culture and literature, and create a written form of Creole as the
 national language. All three Fronts have dozens of primary schools
 and there is a nurses training school at the PAIGC Solidarity Hospital
 at Boke in Guinea-Conakry. Each of the three Fronts has a higher level
 primary school for boarding students. The more advanced students go
 to the PAIGC Pilot School in Conakry where there is also a Kin-
 dergarten.
 In the field of health the PAIGC has increased the number of
 18
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 doctors and has a network of field hospitals and 'sanitary posts' in the
 liberated zones. In neighboring Senegal and Guinea there are larger
 hospitals. For the more remote places in the country the 'sanitary
 brigades' bring health services and medicines. In the area of health
 and education the Portuguese lost the war before it even started.
 The Declaration of State
 Without an understanding of the activities and struggle prior to the
 proclamation of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau one might fall into the
 error of assuming that the proclamation was simply a "propaganda
 stunt" as the Portuguese have said. In fact, the proclamation is based
 solidly on more than a decade of armed struggle and development of
 the human and economic resources in the liberated zones.
 Since the Fall of 1972 when PAIGC Secretary General Amilcar
 Cabral visited the United States it was known that a proclamation
 would be forthcoming in 1973. The plot against Cabral and the PAIGC
 delayed the date, but, significantly, did not stop it. The date of 19
 September, the 17th anniversary of the founding of the Party, was
 determined to be the proper time. Unfortunately relations between
 Senegal and Guinea-Conakry were ruptured just before the 19th and
 the actual declaration was not made until 24 September. The year had
 not been spent idly, but great effort had been expended to guarantee
 the maximum amount of support possible toward the diplomatic
 recognition of the new African nation. At the time of this writing more
 than 70 nations have extended diplomatic recognition. They include all
 black African nations except Malawi and most Arab nations. Among
 major powers the USSR, The Peoples' Republic of China, and India
 have also extended recognition. In the West, Guinea-Bissau has been
 recognized by Guyana and Cuba. Several Eastern European nations
 are on the list, including Yugoslavia and Rumania. Pressure is
 building for recognition in Sweden, Norway and Holland. Both Norway
 and Holland are members of NATO and it would be very significant if
 they made the move. The recent change of government in Australia
 has also led some to anticipate support from that quarter. At present,
 more governments recognize Guinea-Bissau, not a U.N. member, than
 Israel, which is a member of the international body.
 Conspicuously absent in this listing are the Western European
 nations, the United States, Canada, Israel, South Africa and the
 majority of the Latin American nations. Canada and Ireland say that
 they are studying the possibility but most others say simply that they
 will take no action. At the recent 16th annual meeting of the United
 States based African Studies Association, the then Assistant Secretary
 of State for African Affairs, David Newsom, said specifically that the
 United States would not recognize the new nation because it did not
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 have a capital and did not actually control the territory it said it
 controlled. The facts that the United States recognized Taiwan as the
 government of all of China and the England-based government of
 France as the only government of wartime France, and that numerous
 journalists and a team of U.N. representatives have traveled in the
 liberated zones of Guinea-Bissau do not get noticed in such an
 argument. The United States and other NATO powers do not yet stand
 ready to confront their poverty-ridden colonial ally in Europe -
 Portugal. During the October 1973 Middle East fighting Portugal stood
 alone among European countries in permitting the transit of American
 arms and munitions to the Tel Aviv government. The United States
 State Department is acutely aware of this and seems likely do amost
 anything in its power to pay the proper "rent" for the Lajes (Azores)
 base which Portugal allowed the United States to use during this crisis,
 and the lease is up for renewal in February 1974.
 It is already rumored in Washington that Portugal will ask for
 funds of a similar magnitude to the funding supplied by President
 Nixon when the lease was renegotiated after a nine year lapse in
 December 1971. This aid package totalled $436 million of credits,
 grants and loans. Moreover the Portuguese will, very likely, be
 requesting modern military equipment to try to counter the improved
 weaponry of the PAIGC. If other rumors are proved correct the PAIGC
 may soon have fighter-bomber aircraft of their own with their own
 pilots. Such potentialities would be very frightening to the Portuguese.
 Reports from Bissau indicate that its anti-aircraft defenses may have
 already been bolstered in anticipation that these rumors may be borne
 out.
 The fate of Guinea-Bissau at the United Nations is therefore a very
 complicated affair, not unrelated to the events in the Middle East as
 well as in Washington and Lisbon.
 When the declaration of state was first issued some thought there
 would be an immediate application for United Nations membership.
 Actually United Nations regulations require that any new nation must
 submit application for membership some weeks in advance and this
 could not have been done. Current PAIGC strategy is to mobilize full
 support before proceding toward formal United Nations application.
 Activities at the United Nations
 One of the most significant actions of the 1973 session of the United
 Nations General assembly was the passage of a resolution which
 "strongly condemned the illegal occupation by Portuguese military
 forces of certain sectors of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and acts of
 aggression committed by them against the people of the Republic".
 The resolution (Agenda Item 107) was sponsored by 57 nations and
 passed by a very wide margin;93 'For', 30 'Abstain', and 7 'No'. The
 nations which voted 'no' were Brazil, Greece, Portugal, South Africa
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 and Spain-all bastions of fascism-and the United Kingdom and the
 United States. It was considered noteworthy that many members of
 NATO abstained rather than vote 'No' as many had expected. A dozen
 Western hemisphere nations voted 'Yes' on this resolution.
 While this resolution should not be confused with U.N. mem-
 bership for the Republic of Guinea-Bissau it is widely acknowledged
 that it brings it a step closer to reality. Also significant is that it has
 been proposed to the first United Nations Committee for a Conference
 on the Law of the Sea that Guinea-Bissau be invited to participate.
 Representatives of Uganda, Kenya, Egypt, Algeria, Cameroon,
 Lesotho, Mali, Senegal and the Soviet Union all supported this in-
 clusion. It was challenged by the Portuguese representative but his
 statement was countered by a point of order by the spokesman for
 Mauritius.
 Within the United States a number of organizations, church groups
 and Congressmen have called for U.S. recognition of the new nation.
 Representatives Charles Diggs and Louis Stokes have been leading
 forces in Washington, and a Committee to Support the Republic of
 Guinea-Bissau has been formed in New York by the American Com-
 mittee on Africa. Numerous demonstrations and pickets have brought
 some pressure on the Portuguese Embassy, Consulates and Missions
 in the United States.
 Within Africa the proclamation has been heralded as a great
 victory against colonialism and the Republic has been given full status
 at the Organization of African Unity as the 42nd member nation. The
 Economic Commission for Africa has also included Guinea-Bissau in
 its organizational activities.
 The current PAIGC strategy is to make the actual application for
 United Nations membership "when conditions are right". Secretary
 General Aristides Pereira of the PAIGC said that "It is essential that
 an overwhelming majority of United Nations member states recognize
 us beforehand."
 Since resolution 107 was passed a subsequent statement was
 moved which "reaffirmed the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle for
 liberation from colonial and foreign domination and alien subjugation
 by all means, including armed struggle". On both votes the United
 States voted 'No' as it did on the steering committee of the United
 Nations when it was proposed to start debate on the admission of
 Guinea-Bissau. The United States or the United Kingdom both have
 veto power on the Security Council through which Guinea-Bissau must
 pass in order to gain admission as a full voting member. Either of
 these governments can stand in the way of progress towards in-
 dependence in Africa as they have regularly done in the past.
 In speculating about the United States vote on the matter at the
 United Nations we must ask two questions.
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 First, what will be Portugal's reaction if the State Department
 decides not to vote against Guinea-Bissau? Officially and publicly
 Portugal would, of course, be opposed, but let us not forget that Por-
 tugal 'lost' Goa with much fussing but no action. Portugal has wit-
 nessed an economic disaster in Guinea-Bissau, a sink-hole of military
 expenditures with no relief in sight. Not only could Portugal live
 without Guinea-Bissau, but withdrawal would provide the short-range
 benefit of 30-40,000 extra troops for Angola or Mozambique. Losing
 mainland Guinea-Bissau would be marginal to NATO strategy if the
 Cape Verde Islands remain under Portuguese control.
 On the other hand, the Portuguese rulers have probably accepted
 the domino theory in relation to their African colonies and would
 hesitate to give up Guinea-Bissau considering the psychological effect
 it would have for the liberation movement elsewhere. But Africa, Asia,
 and Latin America are graveyards of domino theories. Colonialists
 and their offspring don't give up land by choice, they give it up when
 they are forced to give it up and where they must. As the PAIGC grows
 stronger the element of choice for the Portuguese is reduced. Although
 they speak of a domino theory they would hardly give up Angola just
 because they gave up Guinea-Bissau.
 The second question is what is to be gained for the United States by
 supporting United Nations membership for Guinea-Bissau. The United
 States is presently quite isolated in the Middle East and Asia. State
 Department officials do not want to erode African support. Standing
 against Guinea-Bissau would certainly have the effect of alienating the
 underdeveloped nations even more. If State Department planners
 decide that Guinea-Bissau has more on the negative side of U.S.
 foreign policy than on the positive side great pressure can be applied to
 the Lisbon government. Everything considered, the United States does
 not need Portugal as much as Portugal needs the United States. The
 effort that Western European nations made to keep themselves out of
 the Middle East hostilities has hardly done them much good as they
 struggle with economic and energy crises. At this point there might be
 several European nations which would permit transhipment of arms to
 Israel. Even aerial refueling can be used if the absence of Azores bases
 made it necessary. The Azores and Portugal are handy but are no
 longer absolutely vital to American interests.
 Thus we can see a number of compelling reasons for the United
 States not to use its Security Council veto against Guinea-Bissau.
 Notably absent from the reasons are any moral or ethnical concerns.
 American priorities are determined primarily by economics, military
 strategy and international political alliances. However, we must not be
 too optimistic, judging from the American record at the United
 Nations in keeping progressive nations from the membership rolls.
 The present stated position is also opposed to Guinea-Bissau. But I
 conclude that it is at least possible that the United States will not use its
 veto. This is not to say that it is likely; nor is to say that Guinea-Bissau
 22
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 will forever be denied its seat. National liberation and independence
 are the central themes of the 20th century. The United States veto can
 do no more than delay the inevitable.
 Conclusions
 Clearly, much that happens on the international front is predicated
 upon events inside Guinea-Bissau. We can expect that the PAIGC
 infrastructure (as set out at the 2nd National Congress) will be further
 consolidated. The numbers of school children and teachers will con-
 tinue to increase. Health services will reach more people and will show
 improvement in treatment capabilities as development aid increases.
 More and better medicines will reach the people in more regular
 shipments to the liberated zones. The PAIGC may increase its
 mechanization and external transport. The small area in the north-
 east, representing the traditional lands of the Fula people, may show
 further constriction. PAIGC control on the waterways will be ac-
 celerated in order to tighten the noose around the isolated fortified
 posts. Attacks on the larger towns may increase. It will not be critical
 that major towns are taken militarily since they may fall of their own
 inability to function, a common outcome of protracted guerrilla
 warfare waged from the countryside. These are some of the possible
 elements of the scenario for the PAIGC in the coming years of struggle
 against Portuguese colonialism.
 Recently a European journalist, Jochen Raffelberg, traveled with
 the Portuguese in the Boe area, but was asked to wear a bullet-proof
 vest and was provided with a heavy military escort. When Raffelberg
 wanted to leave his helicopter and look on the ground a landing zone
 was secured in advance by Portuguese commandos. His stay on the
 ground was limited to ten minutes even though an armed Portuguese
 helicopter hovered above. The new Portuguese Minister of National
 Defense, Dr. Silva Cunha, says that the PAIGC claims of liberated
 zones are "lies" and "there are no liberated zones in Guinea-Bissau".
 This statement was made at the ceremony which retired the Por-
 tuguese military governor from Bissau last year and installed a new
 one with hopes of better luck against the PAIGC.
 Plainly the Portuguese have gone a long way in fooling themselves
 about their invincibility. It seems that it is up to the PAIGC to bring the
 Portuguese up against the 20th century realities of Guinea-Bissau and
 the world.
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